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In response to major corporate failures in the last decade or so, public authorities around the 
world have introduced new governance codes and guidelines. Among other aspects, they 
focus on board composition and conduct, particularly emphasising the independence of 
boards. Independent directors, considered to be the “custodians of the governance process,” 
are assumed to have less or no conflicts of interest in the companies they serve. The 
justification is that board members with a connection to the company or its management do 
not assess company performance impartially and might even collude with managers, as they 
could have a vested interest in the company’s business dealings. The presence of independent 
directors on boards is supposed to add more value, as these directors impartially oversee the 
executive directors. This concept seems to have been accepted as conventional wisdom 
around the world. Many corporate governance advocates suggest that a board should be made 
up of all or a majority of independent directors, while others suggest that a board should 
include a balance of independent and executive directors (see for example, American Law 
Institute 1994; Business Roundtable 2010; Council of Institutional Investors 2011; Financial 
Markets Authority 2004). Although the use of independent directors has become increasingly 
accepted, especially in Anglo-American countries where the stock market performance of 
listed companies attracts a great deal of interest from the public, some scholars question its 
rationale (e.g., Bhagat & Black 2002; Black, De Carvaho & Gorga 2010; Chhaochharia & 
Grinstein 2007; Coles, Daniel & Naveen 2008; Donaldson & Davis 1991; Duchin, Matsusaka 
& Ozbas 2010; Hermalin & Weisbach 1991; Muth & Donaldson 1998; Nicholson & Kiel 
2007). These critics argue that monitoring by independent directors can be ineffective. They 
point out that, while independent board members could be independent in their evaluation of 
corporate performance, they usually have much less knowledge of the company and their 
judgment is largely based on (biased) information provided by the managers. Moreover, 
while the profile of independent board members is clearly defined by law and regulations, 
there is a small pool of talented independent directors available in many smaller countries, 
ultimately forcing corporations to have either time-constrained skilled independent board 
members who hold multiple positions or less competent independent directors on their 
boards. In recent years, a growing trend in hiring outside professionals has prompted 
researchers to investigate whether their presence actually has a positive impact on corporate 
performance. 
The existing literature does not demonstrate a definitive relationship between board 
composition and corporate performance. Empirical evidence on the association between the 
presence of independent directors and firm performance is equivocal. Independent directors, 
for example, have been reported to have a positive effect on firm performance in several 
European countries (Krivogorsky 2006), New Zealand (Hossain, Prevost & Rao 2001), Korea 
(Black Jang & Kim 2006), Scandinavia (Oxelheim & Randoy 2003) and Chile (Lefort & 
Urzua 2008). However, except for small firms (Daily & Dalton 1992), the presence of 
independent directors on corporate boards in the US has been observed to have a negative 
impact on firm performance (Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Bhagat & Black 2002; Dalton et al. 
1998; Hermalin & Weisbach 1991; Yermack 1996). Similar results have been documented 
for Canadian firms (Klein, Shapiro & Young 2004, 2005), Australian firms (Lawrence & 
Stapledon, 1999) and Brazilian firms (Black et al. 2010). The negative effect of independent 
directors on firm performance certainly contradicts the accepted corporate governance norms 
that favor board independence. Additionally, there are several other studies reporting that 
independent directors have no significant effect on firm performance whatsoever (see, for 
example, Adjaoud, Zeghal & Andaleeb 2007; Pham, Suchard & Zein 2008). More recently, 
Erkens, Hung and Matos (2010) observed that board independence was negatively correlated 
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with accumulated stock returns during the 2007 financial crisis, whereas Duchin et al. (2010) 
reported that outside directors can increase (decrease) firm value when information cost is 
low (high). All of these studies suggest that the verdict on the usefulness of independent 
directors is far from settled and that we cannot develop a generalised conclusion based on 
international evidence.  
In this paper, we investigate if “board independence matters” using data from New 
Zealand, which has a much smaller capital market in both absolute and relative (to its GDP) 
terms as compared with many other developed markets. We believe that the New Zealand 
market provides an interesting setting to explore this issue for several reasons. First, the 
proportion of independent directors on New Zealand firm boards has been increasing since 
the introduction of the New Zealand Corporate Governance Best Practice Code in October 
2003 to such an extent that currently independent directors form the majority on corporate 
boards. A previous study of New Zealand covered a period when the concept of 
independence had just been introduced and independent board members were a minority. It is 
necessary to investigate a more recent period reflecting more recently accepted practices. 
Second, listed New Zealand firms have quite a high ownership concentration. As the impact 
of independent directors on firm performance in highly concentrated ownership firms has still 
not been settled (Klein et al. 2005, Krivogorsky 2006; Lefort & Urzua 2008), the results from 
our study are expected to contribute to the debate in the literature. Third, a recent study has 
contended that directors of New Zealand firms put less weight on their monitoring role and 
are evolving towards a more collaborative role with management (Anderson, Melanson & 
Maly 2007). These changes in the directors’ views and practices are more consistent with 
stewardship theory than with agency theory. In addition to traditionally employed measures 
such as Tobin’s Q and accounting performance measures, we further contribute to the 
literature by employing Economic Value Added (EVA) as an alternative performance 
measure to examine the effects of independent directors on firm value.  
Our results generally indicate that, instead of adding value, independent directors in 
New Zealand have a negative impact on firm values which is in line with recent findings in 
this literature (Black et al. 2010; Chhaochharia & Grinstein 2007; Duchin et al. 2010) This 
finding is important given the increasing trend of independence in New Zealand firm boards 
and suggests that board independence, which is considered to be a better monitoring function, 
may not be suitable for firms in this country.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly reviews 
the relevant literature linking independent directors to firm performance and develops our 
hypotheses. The third section describes the methodology and data. The fourth section 
discusses the results and the fifth shows the robustness of the results while the final section 
concludes. 
 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development   
 
Why do independent directors in different countries have different effects on firm 
performance? It is well known that corporate performance and its relationship to the board 
need to be studied within the broader picture of the corporate structure and governance of a 
country. One possibility is the institutional and corporate structure differences among the 
countries studied. For example, the level of ownership concentration may influence the 
effectiveness of independent directors in monitoring firm performance (Lawrence & 
Stapledon 1999). This is an important issue to be considered in the present study. Healy 
(2003) documented that institutional ownership is approximately 76% in New Zealand, which 
is much higher than in the US or the UK, where institutional ownership is 39.8% and 60.8%, 
respectively. The high level of ownership concentration in New Zealand could act as a 
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substitute for the weak legal protection of investors and its less developed capital market 
(Mikkelson & Partch 1997; Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Highly concentrated ownership could 
increase the alignment of incentive of managers and large shareholders, which would 
minimise agency problems, resulting in improved firm performance. It could also be argued 
that a high level of ownership concentration can cause an “entrenchment effect” and have 
negative effects on company performance and valuation (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988). 
That is, at higher levels of ownership concentration, large shareholders may make suboptimal 
decisions that benefit their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, which could 
deteriorate the firm’s performance and valuation. The empirical evidence on the relationship 
between independent directors and the performance of highly concentrated ownership firms 
is mixed. Klein et al. (2004, 2005) reported a negative relationship between performance and 
the presence of independent directors of highly concentrated ownership firms in Canada, 
while several other studies have found a positive relation for similar firms, for example, in 
New Zealand (Hossain, Prevost & Rao 2001), European countries (Krivogorsky 2006) and 
Chile (Lefort & Urzua 2008). 
Another possibility for the mixed results on the impact of independent directors on 
firm performance could be the choice of performance measure. Most previous studies used 
Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance. Tobin’s Q, however, does not always indicate firm 
performance. It could also reflect growth opportunities related not to managerial decisions 
but to external conditions (Pham, Suchard & Zein 2007).  Because the effects of independent 
directors on firm performance may differ depending on the performance measures used, 
different measures of firm performance may produce different results (Krivogorsky 2006; 
Lawrence & Stapledon 1999). A recent study by Elali (2006) found that Economic Value 
Added (EVA) outperforms Tobin’s Q in explaining shareholder wealth. Except for Adjaoud 
et al. (2007) and Pham et al. (2008), there have been a limited number of studies that directly 
examine the effects of independent directors on firm performance using EVA as a 
performance measure. Interestingly, both studies report an insignificant relationship between 
board independence and EVA.  
A further possibility for the ambiguous results could be that not all independent 
directors are truly independent or add value (Bhagat & Black 2002). In a recent paper, Cohen, 
Frazzini and Malloy (2010) showed that, in the US, while firms technically appoint 
independent directors based on regulatory definition, in reality, the independent directors are 
overly sympathetic to management. Based on a hand-collected database, the authors found 
that financial analysts who were overly optimistic regarding the firms’ performance in the 
past were more likely to be appointed as independent directors of those firms. Furthermore, 
the issue of whether the independent directors are in the majority could also play a role. In 
studies documenting a positive relationship between independent directors and firm 
performance, the mean proportion of independent directors is less than 50% (see for example, 
Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Black et al. 2006; Dalton et al. 1998; Hossain, Prevost & Rao 
2001; Krivogorsky 2006; Lefort & Urzua 2008; Mura  2007; Oxelheim & Randoy 2003; 
Yermack 1996). These results could suggest that independent directors add value when they 
are in the minority on the board.   
Previous literature on the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance generally recognises two theories: agency theory and stewardship theory 
(Nicholson & Kiel 2007). Agency theory, which dominates the corporate governance 
literature, has its basis in the separation of ownership and management and the divergent 
interests between the two. As such, it requires control of management by boards of directors 
operating as agents for the owners. External directors are expected to be free from the 
influence of the firm’s management, which allows them to perform their duties more 
effectively and provide more value than internal directors. Effective monitoring by 
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independent directors is expected to lower agency costs and increase firm performance 
(Baysinger & Butler 1985; Fama 1980; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Lefort & Urzua 2008).  
Therefore, according to this theory, board independence should be positively 
associated with firm performance. Despite substantial research, as discussed earlier, on the 
relationship between boards and firm performance, the extant empirical results are far from 
conclusive.  
Stewardship theory refutes the notion of self-interested managers, claiming that 
managers and non-independent directors are good stewards of the resources entrusted to them 
and can be trusted to maximise the value of firms. Managers are driven by non-financial 
motives, such as the need for achievement and recognition, the satisfaction of successful 
performance and a strong work ethic (Donaldson & Davis 1991; Muth & Donaldson 1998). 
Thus, demands for extensive monitoring and controls by external directors are not needed.  
Non-independent directors involved in the company on a daily basis are assumed to have a 
better commitment to the company and its goal. However, independent directors may not 
have the necessary skills and knowledge, may be less committed to the company and may 
“fail to support and empower management and reduce company performance” (Muth & 
Donaldson 1998, p. 10).  
A recent study has found that, in the period after the New Zealand Corporate 
Governance Best Practice Code was introduced, directors of New Zealand firms viewed their 
roles more as active partners with management rather than as monitors (Anderson et al. 
2007). As a matter of law in New Zealand, directors must act in what they consider to be the 
best interest of the company which may not necessarily mean acting in the best interest of 
shareholders. This is in line with the emerging view that the conventional notion of a board’s 
control role, originating from agency theory, should expand to incorporate a service role 
“where the board is expected also to be more active in setting the strategic direction and 
decision making of the firm in conjunction with management” (Ingley & Karoui 2010, 
p.129). These collaborative views and practices are more consistent with stewardship theory 
than with agency theory.  
The controversy regarding the role of internal and external directors is at the heart of 
both agency and stewardship theory. We investigate which of these theories is more relevant 
and supportive of the current situation in New Zealand. We contend that, when there is a 
majority of internal directors in firms, it could be beneficial for firms.  Therefore, our 
hypotheses are as follows: 
 H1: Independent directors are negatively related to firm performance. 
H2: Independent directors add value as long as they are the minority on a board. 
 




We obtain financial data of firms listed in New Zealand from the NZX Deep Archive 
database from 2004 to 2006 and hand collect corporate governance information from the 
firms’ annual reports. We exclude firm-year observations that do not have the necessary 
variables to run the regression model and extreme firm performance variables below the 1st 











We examine the effects of independent directors on firm performance by regressing measures 
of firm performance as the dependent variable on several corporate governance and control 
variables. The performance measures that we use are: EVA, Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE. 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt 
divided by total assets. ROA is calculated as the net income divided by total assets, and ROE 
is calculated as the net income divided by total equity.  
EVA is defined as:  
EVA = IC x (ROIC - WACC).                                                                                    (1) 
where:  
IC = Invested capital at the beginning of the year calculated as total assets at t-1 and non-interest-bearing 
liabilities at t-1 
ROIC = Return on Invested Capital = NOPLAT/invested capital at the beginning of the year 
NOPLAT = EBIT – taxes + changes in balance sheet deferred taxes 
Taxes = Income tax + tax shield on interest expense  
WACC = Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
We deflated EVA by 1,000,000 so that the scale would be consistent with that of the other variables (Adjaoud et 
al. 2007).  
 
To examine the relationship between the proportion of independent directors and firm 














       (2)     
The independent variable, % IND, is the proportion of independent directors and is 
calculated as the number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors. 
Independent directors are defined according to New Zealand Stock Exchange Listing Rules, 
i.e., as non-executive directors holding less than 5% of the voting securities and having no 
direct or indirect interest or relationship that could reasonably influence their objective 
judgment and decision making. The existing literature on board size (BDSIZE) and firm 
performance usually reports that board size is negatively correlated with firm performance 
(Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wells 1998; Larcker, Richardson & Tuna 2007; Yermack 1996). 
Smaller boards are expected to work more efficiently than larger boards. Furthermore, 
Larcker et al. (2007) reported that the busier the directors, the lower the firm performance. 
The variable BUSY is the percentage of busy independent directors. An independent director 
is classified as a busy director if he or she serves as a director at more than three other 
companies. Larcker et al. (2007) also found that firms with a greater proportion of 
blockholders exhibit superior operating performance. However, Hossain, Prevost and Rao 
(2001) and Bhagat and Black (2002) found that blockholders are negatively correlated with 
firm performance. BLOCK is the cumulative percentage of shares held by shareholders 
holding at least 5% of ordinary shares in the firm. As discussed earlier, this variable is 
important in our study, as the New Zealand listed firms generally have high levels of 
ownership concentration. We also include audit committee size (ACSIZE) in our analysis, as 
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audit committees are expected to enhance the monitoring role of directors. Finally, we 
incorporate several commonly used control variables into our regressions. These variables are 
LEV, the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; B/M, the book to market ratio; and SIZE, the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equities.   
In studies of firm performance and its relationship to corporate governance factors, 
which, in our case, is board composition, the issue of endogeneity needs to be addressed (see 
for example, Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Hermalin & Weisbach 1991). In addition to 
employing OLS regressions, we address this issue by using two-stage least square 
regressions. Following Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell 
(2008), we use the lagged values of independent variables as instruments for independent 
directors. Similar to Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), in this estimation procedure, we assume 
that firm performance and independent directors are the only endogenous variables.2 
We further use lagged values of firm performance as independent variables (Hermalin 
& Weisbach 1991; Rajgopal & Shevlin, 2002) to examine whether the independent directors’ 
choice to sit on a board is affected by the firm’s past performance. To accomplish this, we 
include the percentage of shares owned by independent directors as a control variable 
(Whidbee 1997). 
Our second hypothesis is that independent directors add value as long as they are in 
the minority on a board. To test this hypothesis, we replace %IND with a dummy variable 
(NIND) that takes the value of 1 if independent directors are the minority and takes 0 













  (3) 
 
Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample firms. On average, as shown by positive 
firm performance across the four performance measures, New Zealand firms are profitable. 
The results show that Tobin’s Q is approximately 1.65, return on assets is 9.5% and return on 
equity is 19%. These returns are well above the average Official Cash Rate, the prime rate in 
New Zealand, of 6.6% during the same period. In terms of EVA, the sample firms did not 
experience a significant increase in value. The average EVA is only around $0.002 million, 
which is only 0.001% of the average firm size.  
Our data also reveal that there are, on average, six directors on a board. The number 
of directors is lower than that of US firms, which is around 12 directors (Yermack, 1996; 
Bhagat and Black, 2002). Board independence ranges from no independence to fully 
independent. Typically, however, independent directors are the majority on a board. The 
mean proportion of independent directors is 0.52.  
                                                            
2 Our two-stage least square regression approach, however, is subject to some limitations. Some may view board 
size and blockholders as also endogenous. The inclusion of more than one endogenous variable, however, would 
involve the difficult task of finding instrumental variables for each equation (Holthausen, Larcker & Sloan 
1995; Ittner & Larcker 2001; Rajgopal & Shevlin 2002). There is also a possibility that our system of equations 
is misspecified because of the omitted variable problem. However, according to Hausman tests that we 
conducted to examine whether independent directors and performance should be treated as endogenous, 
endogeneity is rejected for all four performance variables. 
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Table 1 further shows that, on average, about 40% of independent directors serve as 
directors in more than three other companies, which is on the lower end internationally. For 
instance, the percentage in the US is closer to 60%. The mean cumulative percentage of 
shares held by shareholders holding more than 5% is 45%, reflecting the fact that the 
ownership of listed firms in New Zealand is highly concentrated. This figure is close to that 
of Laporta et al. (1998), who reported the mean shares owned by blockholders in New 
Zealand at 48%. High ownership concentration can discourage efficiency-enhancing 
takeovers as a transfer of control can take place with the consent of only a limited number of 
large blockholders (Prevost, Rao & Hossain 2002). The presence of large blockholders could 
protect the board from external market discipline, which reduces value. But their presence 
could also enhance the effectiveness of independent directors in monitoring firm performance 
(Larcker et al. 2007).  
 
Table 1 
Sample descriptive statistics 
 MEAN SD MIN 25TH MEDIAN 75TH MAX 
Tobin’s Q 1.647 1.348 0.341 0.948 1.169 1.853 8.243 
ROA 0.095 0.119 -0.571 0.063 0.089 0.146 0.393 
ROE 0.190 0.214 -0.874 0.105 0.170 0.297 0.812 
EVA (in millions) 0.002 0.018 -0.126 -0.001 0.001 0.006 0.065 
%IND 0.519 0.224 0.000 0.333 0.500 0.667 1.000 
NIND 0.466 0.501 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
BDSIZE 6.165 1.660 2.000 5.000 6.000 7.000 12.000 
BUSY 0.391 0.345 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.667 1.000 
ACSIZE 3.363 1.077 0.000 3.000 3.000 4.000 7.000 
BLOCK 0.451 0.250 0.000 0.259 0.465 0.655 0.944 
LEV 0.422 0.195 0.020 0.290 0.406 0.550 1.228 
B/M 0.765 0.868 -0.175 0.325 0.604 0.994 10.044 
MKTVAL (in 
millions) 
11.609 1.408 8.117 10.524 11.609 12.618 14.776 
Notes: 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the sum of market equity and book value of debt, divided by total assets. ROA is 
return on assets. ROE is return on equity. EVA is invested capital at the beginning of year x (return on invested 
capital – weighted average cost of capital). %IND is the proportion of independent directors on a board defined 
as the number of independent directors/total number of directors. NIND is a dummy variable of 1 if a firm board 
is nonindependent. BDSIZE is total number of directors. BUSY is the proportion of independent directors who 
serve in more than three other companies. ACSIZE is the number of directors on the audit committee. BLOCK 
is the cumulative percentage of shares held by shareholders holding at least 5% of ordinary shares in the firm. 
LEV is long-term debt/total assets. B/M is book to market ratio and MKTVAL is the market value equity. There 
are 182 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2006.  
 
Table 2 presents the correlations among the variables. Tobin’s Q is not significantly 
correlated with the other three performance variables. ROA and ROE are highly correlated 
(0.79). EVA as a measure of value added is not highly correlated with these two accounting-
based profitability measures. This finding could be seen as consistent with the views of the 
proponents of EVA that positive accounting-based profit measures do not always increase 
firm value.  
As predicted, the correlations between the proportion of independent directors 
(%IND) and the three performance measures (ROA, ROE and EVA) are strongly negative. 
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Although statistically insignificant, negative performance relations are also observed for 
board size (BDSIZE). The proportion of busy independent directors is negatively correlated 
with Tobin’s Q. This finding could be interpreted as in line with stewardship theory, which 
states that busy independent directors are not fully committed to the companies they serve. 
Block ownership is negatively correlated with the proportion of independent directors, 
suggesting that block owners and the proportion of independent directors substitute for 
monitors. Block ownership is also negatively correlated with EVA, which suggests that high 
ownership decreases firm value.  
 
Table 2 
Correlation matrix among the corporate governance variables and performance measures 
  
Tobin’s 
Q ROA ROE EVA %IND NIND BDSIZE BUSY ACSIZE BLOCK LEV B/M 
ROA -0.032     
 
      
ROE 0.085 0.788    
 
      
EVA 0.118 0.246 0.189     
 
            
%IND -0.105 -0.166 -0.191 -0.144  
 
      
NIND 0.054 0.111 0.173 0.131 -0.823 
 
      
BDSIZE -0.020 -0.011 -0.132 -0.070 -0.088 0.044       
BUSY -0.137 0.109 0.076 0.019 0.150 
-
0.156 0.055      
ACSIZE -0.039 0.089 -0.027 -0.065 0.040 
-
0.084 0.312 0.069     
BLOCK 0.011 0.025 0.021 -0.122 -0.066 0.058 -0.092 -0.071 -0.120    
LEV -0.052 -0.039 0.343 -0.086 -0.014 0.088 -0.106 0.071 -0.141 -0.137   
B/M -0.372 -0.205 -0.278 -0.158 0.020 -0.16 0.079 0.030 0.070 -0.011 -0.217  
SIZE 0.144 0.240 0.150 0.065 0.043 
-
0.118 0.390 0.196 0.107 0.258 -0.056 -0.150 
Notes: 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the sum of market equity and book value of debt, divided by total assets. ROA is 
return on assets. ROE is return on equity. EVA is invested capital at the beginning of year x (return on invested 
capital – weighted average cost of capital). %IND is the proportion of independent directors on a board defined 
as the number of independent directors/total number of directors. NIND is a dummy variable of 1 if a firm board 
is nonindependent. BDSIZE is total number of directors. BUSY is the proportion of independent directors who 
serve in more than three other companies. ACSIZE is the number of directors on the audit committee. BLOCK 
is the cumulative percentage of shares held by shareholders holding at least 5% of ordinary shares in the firm. 
LEV is long-term debt/total assets. B/M is book to market ratio and SIZE is the natural logarithm of market 
value equity. There are 182 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2006.  
Table 3 reports results for the OLS and 2-Stage regressions of firm performance on 
corporate governance and control variables. The results from OLS and the 2-Stage 
regressions are largely similar. Consistent with our first hypothesis, the proportion of 
independent directors on a board (%IND) is negatively correlated with all four performance 
measures and significantly correlated with ROA and ROE.3 These results point to the fact 
that the presence of an independent board has a negative impact on firm value, and these 
results are consistent with those reported in prior studies (Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Bhagat 
& Black 2002). Our findings, on the whole, contradict the notion that company boards should 
                                                            
3 The results are similar but of opposite signs when we use the proportion of non-independent directors (defined 
as 1-%IND) instead of %IND. We find that non-independent directors are positively associated with the four 
firm performance measures and significantly correlated with ROA and ROE. These results, to conserve space, 
are not reported but are available upon request. 
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consist mostly of independent directors. Board size (BDSIZE) is also negatively related to 
performance and significantly related to ROA and ROE. This finding is consistent with prior 
studies (Eisenberg et al. 1998; Hossain, Prevost & Rao 2001;Yermack, 1996) showing that 
the larger the board size, the less efficient the monitoring function of the directors, which 
reduces the value of the company.  
Table 3 
Cross sectional regression results for firm performance on corporate governance variables 
  OLS 2-SLS OLS 2-SLS OLS 2-SLS OLS 2-SLS 
  Tobin’s Q ROA ROE EVA 
Intercept 1.828** 0.772 -0.036 0.125 -0.078 0.025 0.016 -0.042*** 
         
%IND -0.585 -0.711 -0.115*** -0.146*** -0.215*** -0.249*** -0.015** -0.005 
         
BDSIZE -0.057 -0.017 -0.013** -0.015** -0.029*** -0.034*** -0.002* -0.001 
         
BUSY -0.522 -0.566* 0.033 0.003 0.034 -0.016 0.002 0.002 
         
ACSIZE -0.031 0.084 0.012 0.009 0.015 0.019 -0.001 -0.002 
         
BLOCK -0.427 -0.446 -0.033 -0.019 -0.018 -0.031 -0.016*** -0.011* 
         
LEV -0.941* -0.36 -0.052 -0.047 0.324*** 0.236** -0.016** 0.003 
         
B/M -0.566*** -0.316*** -0.024** -0.026*** -0.041** -0.038** -0.003** -0.001 
         
SIZE 0.155** 0.151* 0.023*** 0.014* 0.034*** 0.033** 0.002* 0.006*** 
         
Adj. R2 0.159 0.119 0.123 0.121 0.221 0.148 0.078 0.206 
N 182 103 182 103 182 103 182 103 
Notes: 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the sum of market equity and book value of debt, divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets. ROE is return 
on equity. EVA is invested capital at the beginning of year x (return on invested capital – weighted average cost of capital). %IND is the 
proportion of independent directors on a board defined as the number of independent directors/total number of directors. BDSIZE is total 
number of directors. BUSY is the proportion of independent directors who serve in more than three other companies. ACSIZE is the number 
of directors on the audit committee. BLOCK is the cumulative percentage of shares held by shareholders holding at least 5% of ordinary 
shares in the firm. LEV is long-term debt/total assets. B/M is book to market ratio and SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value equity. 
Sample period is from 2004 to 2006.  
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level 
Table 3 also reports that blockholders (BLOCK) are negatively correlated with 
performance. This result is similar to those reported in prior studies (Hossain, Prevost & Rao 
2001; Johnson et al. 2000; Laporta et al. 1998) that show that high firm ownership 
concentration has a somewhat negative impact on firm value.  
The percentage of busy independent directors is negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q, 
suggesting that busy independent directors do not add value, as they may not be fully 
committed to the company for which they sit as independent directors. The low average 
percentage of busy directors on a board (as reported in Table 1), however, may explain the 
weak significance of the relationship between the percentage of busy independent directors 
and firm performance.    
In Table 4, we report the results of cross-sectional regressions on the relationship 
between the proportions of independent directors and lagged corporate governance variables. 
We observe that the lagged performances are negatively correlated with independent 
variables but are not statistically significant. These results confirm that endogeneity is not a 
problem in our study, and the results are generally consistent with Dahya et al. (2008), 
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showing that the relationship between firm performance and independent directors runs only 
in one direction. 
 
Table 4 
Cross sectional regression results on the relation between the proportion of independent directors and 
lagged corporate governance variables 


































































































ROA-1   
-0.056 
    
ROE-1     -0.047   
EVA-1       -0.029 
        
Adj. R2 0.625  0.622  0.622  0.621 
N 103  103  103  103 
Notes: 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the sum of market equity and book value of debt, divided by total assets. The dependent variable is 
%IND which is the proportion of independent directors on a board defined as the number of independent directors/total number 
of directors. ROA is return on assets. ROE is return on equity. EVA is invested capital at the beginning of year x (return on 
invested capital – weighted average cost of capital). %SIND is the proportion of shares owned by independent directors. 
BDSIZE is total number of directors. BUSY is the proportion of independent directors who serve in more than three other 
companies. ACSIZE is the number of directors on the audit committee. BLOCK is the cumulative percentage of shares held by 
shareholders holding at least 5% of ordinary shares in the firm. LEV is long-term debt/total assets. B/M is book to market ratio 
and SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value equity. Sample period is from 2004 to 2006.  
 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
In Table 5, we present our results for the regression of firm performance variables on 
non-independent boards and other corporate governance and control variables. The 
coefficient of interest here is NIND, which positively correlates with four performance 
measures and has a particularly significant relationship with ROA and ROE. These results are 
essentially in line with our second hypothesis that independent directors add value as long as 
AABFJ  |  Volume 6, no. 2, 2012 
14 
 
they are in the minority, but when they become the majority, their effectiveness as monitors 
diminishes, which reduces firm value. The results for the other independent variables are 
principally similar to those reported in Table 3. Board size, the proportion of busy 
independent directors and blockholders are negatively correlated with firm performance. One 
common factor that can be observed, as in prior studies, is that the presence of independent 
directors is positively related to firm performance when they are the minority, but their 
presence negatively affects firm value when they are the majority. This observation may 
suggest that not all independent directors have the necessary knowledge, experience, time 
and skills to be effective monitors (Klein 1998), and, consistent with stewardship theory, that 
some or most of them are not good stewards of the companies they serve (Muth & Donaldson 
1998).  
As far as New Zealand is concerned, only one study has investigated the issue of 
board composition and firm performance (Hossain, Prevost & Rao 2001). During the period 
investigated, it can be noted that the independent directors of New Zealand firms were the 
minority on a board in more than half of the sample period. Therefore, we possibly could 
argue that the positive relationship between independent directors and performance reported 
in that study could be attributed to the performance of a non-independent board and not to 
that of an independent board. The proportion of independent directors at New Zealand firms 
has been growing over time. Taking into account more recent practice, our current research 
findings provide a worthwhile outcome for New Zealand. 
 
Table 5 
Cross sectional regression results on the relation between firm performance and the minority 
independent directors  
  Tobin’s Q   ROA  ROE   EVA 
Intercept 0.422   0.037   -0.126   -0.046*** 
NIND 0.069  0.046**  0.083**  0.002 
BDSIZE 0.000  -0.013**  -0.032**  -0.001 
BUSY -0.589**  -0.002  -0.024  0.002 
ACSIZE 0.065  0.004  0.011  -0.002* 
BLOCK -0.421  -0.021  -0.035  -0.011* 
LEV -0.314  -0.036  0.254**  0.003 
B/M -0.312***  -0.023**  -0.033*  -0.001 
SIZE 0.141   0.013*   0.032**   0.006*** 
        
Adj. R2 0.107   0.109  0.144   0.209 
N 103  103  103  103 
Notes: 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the sum of market equity and book value of debt, divided by total assets. ROA is return on 
assets. ROE is return on equity. EVA is invested capital at the beginning of year x (return on invested capital – weighted 
average cost of capital). NIND is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if independent directors are the minority on 
a board, 0 otherwise. BDSIZE is total number of directors. BUSY is the proportion of independent directors who serve in 
more than three other companies. ACSIZE is the number of directors on the audit committee. BLOCK is the cumulative 
percentage of shares held by shareholders holding at least 5% of ordinary shares in the firm. LEV is long-term debt/total 
assets. B/M is book to market ratio and SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value equity. Sample period is from 2004 
to 2006.  
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level 
 








Although the two-stage regression model can address endogeneity, the statistical properties of 
the simultaneous regression estimates are sensitive to the choice of instrumental variables 
because even the instrumental variables themselves can be partially endogenous (Larcker & 
Rusticus 2006). Therefore, we address both the endogeneity and fixed panel effects by using 
the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) method and a generalised method of moment 
estimation (GMM). The GMM permits simultaneous control of both endogeneity and firm 
fixed effects (Mura 2007). In addition to these two estimation methods for our robustness 
tests, we also use the OLS method with adjustments in the standard errors of the OLS 
estimators, assuming the presence of both firm and time fixed effects (Petersen 2009) 4.  
The results, not reported here to save space, are all largely in line with those reported 
in Table 3 and confirm our hypothesis that the presence of a majority of independent 




In this paper, we examined the effects of independent directors on firm performance. We 
found that, on average, independent directors are negatively associated with several measures 
of performance. On the basis of our findings, we could argue that independent directors add 
value only when they are in the minority. We note that the presence of independent directors 
is negatively (positively) associated with firm performance when they are in the majority 
(minority) on a board. Our results confirm recent findings in the literature that good 
governance practices are not universal but may depend on market and firm characteristics 
(Black et al. 2010; Coles et al. 2008; Chhaochharia & Grinstein 2007; Duchin et al. 2010). 
A possible explanation as to why a board consisting mostly of independent directors 
could have a negative impact on firm value could be that the behaviour of executive or non-
independent directors cannot be entirely explained by agency theory, which assumes that 
managers maximise their self-interest at the expense of shareholders. The New Zealand stock 
market consists mostly of small firms suggesting that it may not be that easy for these firms 
to have truly independent boards (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007; Duchin et al. 2010). The 
relatively small size of the New Zealand market could also suggests that directors are 
strongly network connected, a characteristic where stewardship theory is likely to hold (Muth 
& Donaldson 1998). The stewardship theory, which contends that managers and non-
independent directors are good stewards of firm assets and are loyal to the company, predicts 
a positive association between management and firm performance. Our results are more in 
line with the latter theory for the period investigated in New Zealand.  
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